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Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Company, 499 F.2d 809

9th Cir.

1974

 

Chapter

16

Title

Products Liability

Page

679

Topic

The Definition of Defective

Quick Notes

Paint fumes in railroad box cars built up and cause a fire.

Book Name

Torts Cases, Problems, And Exercises.  Weaver, Third Edition.  ISBN:  978-1-4224-7220-0.

 

Issue

o         Whether the duty to inform the individual is necessary if the employer has been informed of the danger?  Yes.

 

Procedure

Trial

o         Jury returned verdict for the defendant.

Appellant

o         Reverse there was indeed an error in the instructions.

 

Facts

Rules

Reason

o         Pl - Jackson

o         Df - Paint Company

What happened?

o         Pl was citizen of Utah.

o         Journeyman painter employed by Utah painting contractor.

o         Pl was sent by employer to paint tanks cars in Montana.

o         Df is Reliance Universal, a Texas manufacturer of industrial paints and coatings.

Fire

o         While the Pl - was spraying paint inside one of the tanks a fire occurred.

o         Df Alleges says the fire was caused by the breakage of a light bulb used by the Pl in the tank.

o         Pl alleges says the fire was caused by static electricity generated by the friction of rubber soles on the tank floor.

Warning Label

o         "Keep away from heat, sparks, and open flame. USE WITH ADEQUATE  VENTILATION. Avoid prolonged contact with skin and breathing of spray mist. Close container after each use. KEEP OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN."

Pl Testified

o         Understood the ventilation warning was for only breathing and not to prevent a fire or explosion.

District Court was erroneous in three respects

 

1.   It suggests that liability is based on negligence rather than strict liability.

  • In strict liability it is of no moment what defendant "had reason to believe."
  • Liability arises from "selling any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."
  • It is the unreasonableness of the condition of the product, not of the conduct of the defendant, that creates liability.
  • Reasonableness focuses on the person and not the produce.

 

2.   Plaintiff has contended that a more specific warning of the fire hazard ought to have been given, namely, that accumulated fumes or vapors in an inadequately ventilated area may be ignited by a spark resulting in a violent fire or explosion.

  • Pl Arg the absence of the specific warning rendered the paint as unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.  There was duty to warn of the particular hazard.
  • Df Arg It had no duty to warn, b/c comment j of 402A says, the danger, or potential danger, is generally know and recognized.
  • Court

o        This is an issue for the jury.

o        The question for the jury is whether "the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized";

o        Whether the product as sold was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics."

 

3.   The most serious error in the challenged instruction is the statement that knowledge of the hazard on the part of plaintiff's employer would obviate any duty to warn plaintiff.

  • Improperly focuses on the knowledge of the individual instead of the general of common knowledge of the community.
  • The sellers duty it to the ultimate user or consumer.
  • The adequacy of warnings must be measured according to whatever knowledge and understanding may be common to painters who will actually open the containers and use the paints; 
  • the possibly superior knowledge and understanding of painting contractors is irrelevant.

 

Davis

o         There we noted that in the case of a prescription drug, normally a warning of dangers given to the physician is sufficient; but we held that when a drug was distributed "to all comers at mass clinics without an individualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved," a warning sufficient to apprise the patient himself of the risks was mandated.

 

Holding

o         Accordingly we hold that the duty to warn runs, on these facts, directly to the painter, and is not discharged when the employer alone is informed of the danger.

 

 

Rules

Unreasonably dangerous.

o        The rule of special liability of a seller of a product for physical harm to user or consumer applies only where the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.

o        The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.

 

Products Liability >> Strict Liability >> Directions or warning.

In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. But a seller is not required to warn when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized.

 

Duty To Warn >> Subjective Knowledge

o        The subjective knowledge of the plaintiff is irrelevant on the issue of duty to warn.

o        The question to be put to the jury is whether the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized, and whether the product as sold was dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.

 

Duty To Warn >> Sellers Duty

o        The seller's duty is to the ultimate user or consumer.

o        The adequacy of warnings must be measured according to whatever knowledge and understanding may be common to the actual users, the possibly superior knowledge and understanding of their supervisors is irrelevant.

 

Contributory Negligence

o        There can be contributory negligence (really called assumption of risk) which bars recovery only if plaintiff, the user or consumer, was aware of and unreasonably embraced the danger.

o        The form of contributory negligence which commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk must be subjective, conscious, and personal to the plaintiff.

o        Such negligence plainly cannot be imputed to the plaintiff from another.

o        Therefore any knowledge plaintiff's employer may have had concerning the hazard which resulted in plaintiff's injury is irrelevant, where the employer did not in fact communicate any superior knowledge to plaintiff prior to the accident.

o        This would be true even if the employer himself had an independent legal duty to warn plaintiff.

 

Class Notes